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SUMMARY RECORD OF THIRTEENTH MEETING OF
QUADRIPARTITE WORKING GROUP ON GERMANY AND BERLIN
APRIL 6, 1960

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Participants:

United Kingdom

Viscount Hood
Mr. Drinkall
Mr. Logan

France

Mr. Laloy
Mr. Winckler
Mr. de Leusse

Germany

Dr. Carstens
Mr. Krapf
Mr. Pauls
Mr. Rueckriegel
Mr. Osterheld

United States

Mr. Kohler
Mr. Hillenbrand
Mr. Vigderman
Mr. Kearney
Mr. McKiernan
Mr. Dean

Defense - Col. Schofield

Mr. Kohler opened the meeting by welcoming Mr. Laloy. Mr. Laloy said he would like to give some impressions of the Khrushchev visit to France which might be of interest to the Group. These impressions were gathered not only from the remarks of Khrushchev himself but from conversations with other members of the Soviet party. The principal impression gained by the French had been that the Soviets were more interested in the German problem than in Berlin itself. True, they had discussed the Berlin issue, but they had not emphasized it. Instead, they had laid emphasis on their theme of a peace treaty for the two German states, the necessity that the Western powers eventually recognize East Germany had been the leitmotiv of the Soviet approach. Mr. Laloy noted that in the long discussion on the final communique the Soviets had finally gained reluctant French acceptance of their well-known formula of general and complete disarmament after they had pointed out that the UN General Assembly had unanimously accepted this wording. The Soviets had made considerable effort to have a recommendation for increased contacts between the two German states included in the communique. Here again their main emphasis had been on the acceptance of the division of Germany by the Western powers. They had made persistent reference to a system of collective security for Europe which French questioning had shown

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to mean the treaty of non aggression and control of Germany which they had advanced in the Berlin Conference of 1954 as well as zones of special controls in Central Europe. The French had received the impression that the Soviets would be moderate in their approach to the Berlin question as long as they could hope for gains in other fields. It was clear that they were interested in Berlin less for its own sake than for its potential use as a lever to move the Western powers to recognition of the Zone. When faced by General de Gaulle's opposition on Germany and other questions, the Soviets had remained entirely affable and had not staged any of the customary scenes. It was hard to see from this short-range viewpoint whether the trip should be considered a success for the Soviets. They had made no gains in the communique, the French press had been well aware of their aims, and there was no rapprochement with the French Government.

Mr. Kohler thanked Mr. Laloy and suggested that the Group turn to consideration of the tactics paper tabled by the American side the previous day. Lord Hood questioned whether our objective on Berlin could be stated to be solely to gain time as suggested by the tactics paper. He said he could not accept the paper's summary rejection of the possibility of an agreement arising from further negotiation on the July 28, 1959 Western proposals; he agreed that Western tactics should start with the sequence: Peace Plan, plebiscite proposal, and a proposal for an all-Berlin solution. Mr. Laloy questioned the remark made by Lord Hood as to the possibility of a Soviet proposal to extend their free city proposal to all of Berlin. He said he thought it highly unlikely that the Soviets would do this in any genuine sense of allowing the creation of an all-Berlin administration and that the only thing the French side had heard along these lines through intelligence channels was the possibility of some sort of coordinating committee between East and West Berlin after West Berlin alone had been converted to a free city. Dr. Carstens said he thought it was highly unlikely that the Soviets would make an all-Berlin proposal which would involve the withdrawal of the GDR authorities from East Berlin to some other city of East Germany, which would be a symbolic defeat of considerable magnitude. In any case, the best way to find out whether reports of Soviet intentions to extend the free city proposal to all of Berlin were serious was for the West to table its own all-Berlin proposal.

Lord Hood said that following the treatment of the all-Berlin proposal in the tactics paper, opinion diverged as to further tactical possibilities. It seemed to him that the July 28, 1959 proposal or the London Working Group Solution "C" would be adequate material for further discussion. However, he did not feel that the Working Group had the authority itself to make a final choice in this matter but rather that such questions should be asked of the Foreign Ministers.

Dr.

Dr. Carstens

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Dr. Carstens said the tactics paper was a most useful introduction to discussion of the subject. He asked that it be renamed "Tactics for Germany and Berlin" rather than concentrating on Berlin alone since the Working Group would of course have to make recommendations for tactics on the all-German question. He said he wished to formally suggest that the Western summit participants give serious consideration before the meeting to the order of treatment of summit subjects so as to prevent the subject of Germany being raised at the end of the summit conference, thus placing the Western negotiators under additional pressure. The German side felt that the Germany and Berlin questions should be sandwiched between consideration of other summit topics -- perhaps in the order of disarmament, Germany and Berlin, and East-West relations. Mr. Kohler said that he thought this might be possible and that the Soviets themselves appeared to use this sequence of topics in their own statements on the summit. Mr. Laloy said he would also be prepared to recommend to the Foreign Ministers that they accept this order of subjects with the amendment that part of the East-West relations discussion should probably precede the discussion on disarmament and take the form of general statements on relations between states.

Mr. Kohler noted that the Soviets would probably raise the subject of nuclear testing in connection with disarmament. Mr. Laloy said he expected this would be the case but that it did not concern France whose position was known. He assumed a discussion of this subject would take place in another forum. Lord Hood said the order suggested by Dr. Carstens seemed reasonable to him and that it would be useful to have East-West relations coming at the end of the proceedings so that the conference might produce some definite if small results.

Dr. Carstens suggested that at some time during discussion of Berlin at the summit one of the Western participants present in detail the Western minimum requirements for the status of Berlin as defined by the Working Group. While there was no expectation that this would lead to Soviet acceptance of the minimum requirements, this move would be extremely useful in the sense of negotiating techniques; it would be desirable for subsequent discussions of the Berlin question to have such a full statement of minimum requirements on the record where reference could be made to it. Dr. Carstens said he felt it was too early to take a final stand on the tactical treatment of the Berlin question at the summit as would be the result if the Working Group accepted the American draft paper. First, there was the danger of leaks. Secondly, in the tactical sense, it might be better to discuss the Berlin question in a broader context than foreseen by the tactics draft and to bring in other possibilities not now contained in it. It was suggested that it would be better to present a report which left open a possibility of choice between a number of courses. Final decisions on this would not be made until subsequent meetings of the Foreign Ministers or even

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of heads of government. Mr. Kohler said he felt the weight of Dr. Carstens' observations but that circumstances were pressing to present a paper to the Foreign Ministers which would embody several concrete possibilities.

Turning to detailed consideration of the tactics paper, Mr. Kohler remarked that the paper reflected our view that, in the light of Soviet intentions on Berlin and Germany, neither reunification nor an enduring Berlin solution could be expected from the summit, so that our best expectation was either a modus vivendi on Berlin or an agreement on machinery for continued negotiation of the question. Mr. Laloy suggested that we should define our negotiating aims on Berlin as the attempt to bring the Soviets to drop their pressure on Berlin. He noted that there were perhaps other possibilities on Berlin than a modus vivendi or continued discussion since the Soviets were interested in other things outside of the Berlin framework. The Soviets had an objective in Berlin. We had none in the sense of a change. We should therefore not formulate our aims as an attempt to seek agreement on Berlin for the Soviets. Mr. Kohler summarised the discussion by saying that perhaps the best definition of our aims on Berlin would be to remove the Soviet threats and possible harassments on Berlin without endangering our over-all goals on Germany. This wording would permit us to permit us in turn to seek either a modus vivendi or continuing machinery or to attempt to achieve the aims by utilizing agreement in other fields to hold the Berlin question in abeyance.

There was a discussion of the sections of the tactics draft covering referral of the Berlin question to a subordinate negotiating body and it was suggested that the Working Group in its next session might draw up the terms of reference or directive to such a negotiating body as the Foreign Ministers so directed.

Dr. Carstens referred to repeated German opposition to including provisions for a time limit or for a reduction of Western forces in any proposal on Berlin made to the Soviets. The present level of Western forces was a necessary backing for the German police in Berlin and preventing civil unrest. Mr. Kohler noted that the military value of the Western forces in West Berlin was not great and that their main function was for internal security. The numbers necessary should be considered in that light.

Dr. Carstens indicated German opposition to the proposal for possible discussion of a peace treaty contained in the tactics draft. He said it involved a number of delicate questions such as that of Germany's Eastern frontiers which were not desirable to discuss as long as there was no chance that negotiations would lead to agreement on German unity because such

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discussion could excite public opinion and might lead to bad feelings between various countries of Europe such as Germany and Poland. Mr. Kohler said that our feeling had been that if the only way out of the Berlin impasse was machinery for continued discussion and negotiation, then we would be better off if we had a subject which treated the German question as a whole and which would carry us for a period of eighteen months to two years until a subsequent meeting. Negotiations on a peace treaty would contain many tactical potentialities, one of them being to show up the true significance of the Soviet draft peace treaty as a punitive treaty designed to partition the country permanently. Mr. Laloy said he had strong objections to the discussion of the peace treaty at this time. Peace treaty negotiations would be either carried on among the four wartime allies in which case there would be an atmosphere of a dictated peace treaty or there would be German participants, thus creating an excellent opportunity for the Soviets and East Germans to advance the status of the East German regime. He doubted whether a discussion on the peace treaty would provide sufficient material for a really lengthy discussion. Lord Hood said he thought the point had been to keep the discussion on Germany going and if the only way the Soviets were willing to enter upon this was to discuss the peace treaty, then we might consider doing so. Mr. Kohler remarked that the discussion of the peace treaty device in the Group had made him less enthusiastic about the idea, but that he continued to believe that it should be mentioned to the Ministers.

The day's discussions concluded with a further review of the draft on the all-German section of the Working Group report. Mr. Carstens expressed strong reservations concerning its mention of an all-German committee under four-power supervision as tactical possibility of further treatment of the German unity question. Mr. Laloy pointed out that the dangers of this proposal were that the four wartime allies might interrupt or suspend their meetings or take other actions which would lead to separate meetings of an all-German committee, thus resulting in a great gain of status for the East German regime.

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